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Abstract 
Implicit bias is often viewed as a hidden force inside people that makes them perform 
inappropriate actions. This perspective can induce resistance against the idea that people are 
implicitly biased and complicates research on implicit bias. I put forward an alternative 
perspective that views implicit bias as a behavioral phenomenon, more specifically, as 
behavior that is automatically influenced by cues indicative of the social group to which 
others belong. This behavioral perspective is less likely to evoke resistance because implicit 
bias is seen as something that people do rather than possess and because it clearly separates 
the behavioral phenomenon from its normative implications. Moreover, performance on 
experimental tasks such as the Implicit Association Test is seen an instance of implicitly 
biased behavior rather than a proxy of hidden mental biases. Because these tasks allow for 
experimental control, they provide ideal tools to study the automatic impact of social cues on 
behavior, to predict other instances of biased behavior, and to educate people about implicitly 
biased behavior. The behavioral perspective not only changes the way we think about implicit 
bias but also shifts the aims of implicit bias research and reveals links with other behavioral 
approaches such as network modeling. 
 
Keywords : implicit bias, functional psychology, racism  
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  Implicit Bias is Behavior: A Functional-Cognitive Perspective on Implicit Bias 
 
  In this brief paper, I argue that there is merit in thinking about implicit bias as a 
behavioral phenomenon. I first discuss the more widespread perspective that views implicit 
bias as a latent mental construct and highlight two important downsides of this perspective. 
Next, I explain the alternative, behavioral perspective and discuss the potential advantages, 
limitations, and implications of that perspective.  
Implicit Bias as a Latent Mental Construct 
 Implicit bias is often thought of as an unobservable structure in the mind of an 
individual (e.g., an association in memory) that drives behavior in an unconscious manner 
(e.g., Amodio & Mendoza, 2010). Because it cannot be observed directly, measures are 
needed that index the strength and nature of implicit bias. Several experimental tasks have 
been adopted for this purpose, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; e.g., Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), Evaluative Priming Task (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995), and Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 
2005). 1 These measures are then used to predict the behaviors that are assumed to be driven 
by an implicit bias (see Figure 1). From this perspective, implicit bias thus qualifies as a 
latent mental construct. 
 This popular perspective on implicit bias has a number of downsides. First, it fosters a 
quite disturbing view on implicit bias: it is an uncontrollable, hidden force inside people that 
makes them perform inappropriate actions. Being told that we are implicitly biased can 
therefore threaten core beliefs about who we think we are and aspire to be (e.g., Sukhera, 
Milne, Teunissen, Lingard, & Watling, 2018). Although this disturbing view might not be an 
                                                 
1 I use the term “experimental task” in a broad sense that applies to any task that allows researchers to exert 
control over the situation that people are exposed to and to register behavior in a standardized manner. 
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inevitable consequence of defining implicit bias as a hidden mental structure, it is likely to be 
an important source of the defensive reactions that many people display when being told that 
they are implicitly biased (e.g., Howell, Gaither, & Ratliff, 2015). As such, the latent mental 
construct perspective has undoubtedly contributed to the controversy that surrounds the 
notion of implicit bias. It is also likely to hamper attempts to reduce implicit bias in society, 
not only because of the controversy it instills but also because the metaphor of a hidden 
mental structure encourages the idea that implicit bias is a stable entity that is difficult to 
change and control (e.g., Sukhera et al., 2018).  
 
 
 Second, a latent mental construct perspective complicates the measurement of implicit 
bias and thus research on this topic. As indicated by the thick line in Figure 1, measures of 
implicit bias are assumed to directly tap into the unobservable structure and hence to provide 
a proxy of this structure. The fact that these measures are used to predict biased behaviors is 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of implicit bias as a latent mental construct that causally 
influences physical behavior (B1 … B4) and can be indexed using a measure that predicts 
behavior. 
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based on the assumption that variations in the measurement outcome reflects variations in the 
underlying implicit bias. It is, however, notoriously difficult to validate this assumption (e.g., 
De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). In fact, because implicit measures 
are likely to reflect multiple mental constructs and processes, it is highly unlikely that 
differences in measurement outcomes reflect differences in one specific mental construct. 
This is not a problem if the measure does exactly what it is expected to do (e.g., it adequately 
predicts biased behavior). But in those (frequent) cases in which the measure does not 
conform with expectations, it is very difficult to determine whether this is due to a problem 
with the measure (e.g., it does not capture implicit bias adequately) or with the theory about 
the construct (i.e., ideas about when and how implicit bias influences behavior; see De 
Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, for a discussion of this issue in the context of 
attitudes research). 
Implicit Bias as a Behavioral Phenomenon 
 These important downsides can be circumvented by adopting an alternative, behavioral 
perspective on implicit bias. Its cornerstone is the idea that implicit bias is a behavioral 
phenomenon rather than a mental structure. In other words, it is something that people do 
rather than something that people possess. More specifically, implicit bias can be defined as 
implicit group-based behavior, that is, behavior which is influenced in an implicit manner by 
cues that function as an indicator of the social group that others belong to. For instance, 
saying that someone is racially biased means that part of what that person does (e.g., whether 
the person smiles at someone, shakes hands with someone, hires someone for a job) is 
influenced by cues indicative of the racial group of others (e.g., skin color). The influence of 
these social cues can be labeled as implicit when it occurs quickly, effortlessly, 
unintentionally, unconsciously, or in a way that is difficult to control (see Moors, 2016, and 
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De Houwer et al., 2009, for more details). 2  For instance, someone shows an implicit racial 
bias when he or she quickly and unintentionally responds fearfully to the presence of another 
person because of the skin color of that person. Implicit group-based behavior can be referred 
to as biased in that behavior is influenced (by social cues) in a systematic way. Note that the 
behavioral perspective is thus amoral in the sense that it does not require a judgment about 
whether the impact of social cues on behavior is inappropriate according to some norm. It 
allows for moral debates but separates them from the behavioral phenomenon in itself. It also 
does not assign blame for biased behavior but simply implies that the behavior is a function 
of social cues in the environment. In the remainder of this section, I discuss potential 
advantages, downsides, and implications of a behavioral perspective on implicit bias. 
Accepting Implicit Bias 
 Compared to implicit bias as seen from a latent mental construct perspective, people 
might be more willing to entertain the possibility that their behavior is implicitly biased in a 
behavioral sense. The behavioral perspective only implies that social cues can have automatic 
effects on behavior. It does not require people to accept a specific theory for why their 
behavior might sometimes be biased (e.g., the idea that behavior can be controlled by hidden 
entities within a person) or to accept the idea that biased behavior necessarily violates some 
norm. Moreover, implicit bias as behavior is probably seen as more malleable than implicit 
bias as a hidden mental structure and might therefore heighten the belief that the problem of 
implicit bias can be remedied. Of course, people will only invest effort into trying to prevent 
or counteract implicit bias if they perceive it to be potentially inappropriate in some respect. 
As noted earlier, a behavioral perspective on implicit bias allows for debates on these 
normative issues but separates them from debates about whether behavior can be influenced 
                                                 
2 I thus equate the term “implicit” with the term “automatic” and define “automatic” as an umbrella term that 
refers to different automaticity features that do not necessarily overlap.  
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automatically by social cues. As such, adopting a behavioral perspective is likely to help 
dampen some of the controversy that surrounds the notion of implicit bias (e.g., Jost et al., 
2009).  
 As noted by a reviewer, many people might resist also the idea that they act in biased 
ways. They might even resist the idea that biased behavior can be changed. Although this is 
certainly possible, a behavioral perspective is likely to engender less resistance than a latent 
mental construct perspective. Both perspectives entail that behavior can be implicitly biased 
but only the latter requires assumptions about hidden mental causes of biased behavior. Both 
perspectives allow for the idea that, when vigilant, implicitly biased behavior can be 
prevented or counteracted but the latent mental construct perspective puts the spotlight on 
stable mental structures rather than on malleable behavior. Moreover, the behavioral 
perspective allows one to clearly separate implicit bias as a behavioral phenomenon from the 
often heated debates about the appropriateness of biased behavior. Finally, as will be argued 
in the next section, experimental tasks can be used to objectively reveal (changes in) biased 
behavior and thus to weaken resistance against the idea of (changes in) biased behavior. 
Ultimately, empirical research will have to determine whether a behavioral perspective 
increases acceptance of the idea of implicit bias. However, by putting forward the behavioral 
perspective as a promising alternative for the latent mental construct perspective, the current 
paper already sets the stage for this research.   
Examining Implicit Bias 
 The idea that implicit bias is a behavioral phenomenon also removes the need for 
measures that tap into a latent mental construct. Instead, so-called measures of implicit bias 
can simply be viewed as instances of implicit bias, that is, as specific examples of behavior 
that is influenced automatically by cues indicative of the social group of others (e.g., see 
Ciarrochi et al., 2016, and De Houwer et al., 2013, for related ideas). For instance, saying that 
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performance on a race-related version of the IAT is an instance of implicit racial bias implies 
that IAT performance (more specifically, differences in the speed of responding in the 
different blocks of the IAT) is influenced automatically by the racial cues of the stimuli on 
the screen. From this perspective, IAT performance, as well as performance on several other 
experimental tasks (e.g., the Evaluative Priming Task; Fazio et al., 1995) is simply implicit 
group-based behavior that is observed under well-controlled conditions.  
 Although a behavioral perspective on implicit bias strips performance on experimental 
tasks from its privileged position as a proxy of hidden mental structures, it continues to 
assign a prominent role to these tasks. Most importantly, they provide ideal tools to examine 
whether and when behavior is implicitly biased. From a behavioral perspective, the presence 
of implicit bias can be established by showing an impact of social cues on behavior under 
conditions of automaticity. Because experimental tasks allow researchers (1) to vary the 
presence of social cues while controlling for possible confounds, (2) to establish conditions of 
automaticity, and (3) to carefully register changes in behavior, they are ideally suited to study 
implicit bias. Although it can be challenging to demonstrate the automatic impact of social 
cues on behavior even in experimental tasks, a behavioral perspective frees implicit bias 
research from the need for proxies of hidden mental constructs, thereby side-stepping debates 
about whether and when variations in task performance reflect variations in hidden mental 
structures. The focus of research is no longer on the hidden mental structures but on the 
behavior itself. 3 
 Based on the plausible assumption that different instances of a particular type of 
implicit bias (e.g., racial bias, gender bias, …) are related to each other (e.g., persons likely to 
                                                 
3 Critics of the behavioral view could emphasize the challenges that it raises. Note, however, that a latent mental 
construct perspective raises the same challenges because performance on experimental tasks can be a proxy of 
hidden mental biases only if it is related to social cues in the environment. Hence, the use of proxies not only 
requires demonstrating the automatic impact of social cues on behavior (e.g., that IAT performance is 
influenced by skin color rather than familiarity of the faces presented on a computer screen) but also raises the 
additional challenge of showing that this effect is related in a particular way to hidden mental biases. 
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emit certain types of racial behavior are also more likely to emit other types of racial 
behavior), one can also continue to explore the potential of experimental tasks as tools to 
predict real-life biased behavior. From a behavioral perspective, the predictive utility of 
performance in these tasks will depend on the extent to which performance is influenced by 
the same cues under the same conditions as real-life biased behavior (see Ciarrochi et al., 
2016). To use an analogy, one could say that performance in experimental tasks such as the 
IAT is related to real-life instances of implicit bias as driving in a driving simulator is related 
to driving in real-life. Because the two elements of each pair are instances of the same 
phenomenon that occur under different circumstances, it is likely that the relation between 
both elements will depend on how similar those circumstances are. Just like the relation 
between driving in a simulator and real-life driving can be examined without having to 
assume that driving in a simulator taps into the latent mental construct that determines real-
life driving, so too can the relation between performance in experimental tasks and real-life 
biased behavior be examined without the need to assume that the former is a measure of a 
hidden mental structure that determines real-life biased behavior (see Figure 1).  
 Finally, a behavioral perspective on implicit bias also facilitates the use of experimental 
tasks for educational purposes. For instance, rather than having to interpret a race IAT score 
as an index of a hidden mental structure that biases behavior, it can simply be described as an 
example of how behavior (i.e., response times) can be influenced by race-related cues even 
when people do not have the intention to be influenced by those cues. As noted above, such a 
behavioral framing of performance in experimental tasks is likely to engender less defensive 
reactions than a framing in terms of hidden mental structures. Because experimental tasks can 
be used to provide objective information about actual differences in performance, they are 
well-suited for demonstrating implicit group-based behavior. Moreover, because the aim is to 
illustrate a type of behavior rather than to measure a latent mental construct, education on 
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implicit bias no longer needs to refer to assumptions about hidden mental structures and how 
those structures relate to task performance and real-life biased behavior. The claim that an 
individual or group of individuals is displaying implicit group-based behavior can be based 
solely on performance during the experimental task. In principle, any automatic effect of any 
social cue on any type of behavior would suffice to demonstrate implicit bias. Because of the 
amoral nature of the behavioral perspective, it is not necessary to also argue that performance 
on the experimental task is inappropriate in some normative sense. Of course, the extent to 
which a demonstration of implicit bias will be impactful is likely to depend on the extent to 
which there is additional evidence showing that, within the global population or a section of 
the population, biased performance in the experimental task is related to important and 
normatively inappropriate real-life instances of biased behavior. Accumulating this additional 
evidence will require effort but this work needs to be done anyway, regardless of the 
perspective on implicit bias that one takes. In sum, a behavioral perspective facilitates 
education on implicit bias by shifting the focus toward actual behavior.  
What about Feelings and Thoughts?   
 Some readers might worry that a behavioral perspective misses out on the fact that 
feelings and thoughts are crucial in implicit bias. When considering conscious feelings and 
thoughts, this problem can easily be circumvented by adopting a broad definition of behavior. 
Behavior is not necessarily limited to the movement of muscles and glands. Also conscious 
feelings and thoughts can be observed (be it only by the person who has them) and thus 
treated as instances of (covert) behavior (Skinner, 1953).  Hence, it is possible to establish 
and study whether and when conscious feelings and thoughts are influenced automatically by 
social cues such as skin color. From a behavioral perspective, such feelings and thoughts 
would be seen as instances of implicitly biased behavior which, like other instances of biased 
behavior, are things that people do rather than possess. Studying implicitly biased feelings 
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and thoughts does not require a definition of implicit bias as a latent mental construct.  
 What about unconscious feelings and thoughts? Because it is not possible to observe or 
intervene in these feelings and thoughts directly, they are typically considered to fall outside 
the scope of behavioral research. However, adopting a behavioral perspective on implicit bias 
does not deny the possibility of adopting a cognitive perspective. Whereas behavioral 
research on implicit bias can be seen as directed at documenting the environmental conditions 
under which implicit group-based behavior occurs (i.e., the moderators of implicit bias), 
cognitive research on implicit bias can be seen as focused on documenting the mental 
processes that mediate implicit group-based behavior (i.e., the mental mediators of implicit 
bias). Because the two approaches have different aims, they do not compete but complement 
each other. I thus subscribe to a functional-cognitive framework for research on implicit bias 
that allows one to reconcile behavioral and cognitive research (De Houwer, 2011; Hughes, 
De Houwer, & Perugini, 2016). In fact, it can be argued that cognitive research on implicit 
bias will benefit from clearly separating the to-be-explained phenomenon (i.e., implicit 
group-based behavior) from mental theories of that phenomenon (e.g., the idea that 
associations in memory are responsible for implicit group-based behavior; see De Houwer et 
al., 2013, 2017, and Hughes et al., for more details).  
 Rather than denying the possibility of a cognitive perspective on implicit bias, a 
behavioral perspective on implicit bias firmly shifts the focus from the mental level to the 
behavioral level. I believe that such a shift in focus is appropriate not only because of the 
practical implications described elsewhere in this paper but also because it brings the concept 
of implicit bias in line with the aims of many implicit bias researchers.  From a behavioral 
perspective, the problem of implicit bias in society is ultimately a behavioral problem. It is all 
about (changing) what people do. It is not primarily about the mental causes of biased 
behavior. Having theories about the mental causes of biased behavior can be useful, not in the 
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least because it can generate ideas about how to change the biased behavior, but ultimately, 
the phenomenon itself is a behavioral one. Just consider the fact that most (applied) 
researchers would be happy with finding ways to reduce biased behavior even if they do not 
have a good cognitive theory of implicit bias (see De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2017, for a discussion of the idea that applied topics in psychology are always primarily 
about behavior in a broad sense). 
Implications 
 Although it is difficult to foresee how exactly the field of implicit bias research will 
change as the result of adopting a behavioral perspective, the impact is bound to be 
substantial. First, it will change the way we communicate about implicit bias. As noted 
above, there are good reasons to assume that this shift will weaken the controversy 
surrounding the concept of implicit bias and thus increase willingness to tackle the problem 
of implicit bias which, at its core, is a behavioral problem. Second, it will facilitate research 
on implicit bias by eliminating the need for measures that can function as proxies of hidden 
mental biases. Experimental tasks will still be used to examine implicit bias, predict real-life 
biased behaviors, and educate people about implicit bias, but the focus of this research will be 
shifted to actual behavior, more specifically the conditions under which behavior is 
influenced by cues indicative of social groups as well as the conditions under which different 
biased behaviors are related. 
 Adopting a behavioral perspective on implicit bias will also bring implicit bias research 
into contact with other approaches in science that focus on behavior rather than latent mental 
constructs. One particularly interesting approach is offered by networks models. In their most 
basic form, network models are graphic ways of describing covariations or causal relations 
between different environmental events, including different behaviors (Robins, 2013; 
Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). For instance, a network model of depression reveals how 
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different symptoms of depression relate to each other and change over time into stable states 
(Cramer et al., 2016). Such a network perspective provides ways to talk about and examine 
depression that does not require one to assume a common latent mental cause of all 
symptoms. Just like network models have revolutionized research on psychopathology (e.g., 
Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Borsboom, Cramer, & Kalis, 2019), they have the potential to 
change the face of research on implicit bias. Most importantly, network models of implicit 
bias do not require the assumption that all instances of biased behavior depend on a common 
latent mental cause. Instead, they can reveal how instances of (racial) behavior causally 
influence each other (e.g., whether and when frequency of contact with outgroups leads to 
racial bias in hiring). 
Conclusion 
 As Machado and Silva (2007) elegantly argued, science in general and psychology in 
particular has much to gain from conceptual analyses. In this paper, I put forward a new 
perspective on a psychological concept that had a huge impact on society during the past 
decade: implicit bias. More specifically, I put forward the idea that implicit bias can be 
thought of as implicit group-based behavior. Adopting this behavioral perspective not only 
implies a shift in thinking about implicit bias but also has important implications for the aims 
and practices of implicit bias research.  
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